Trend: Future battlefields

A trend indicates a direction of change in values and needs which is driven by forces and manifests itself already in various ways within certain groups in society.

There is increasing attention on emerging technologies for military use, such as drones, armed robots and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in weapons. Some of the technologies are already mature (e.g. drones, hypersonic weapons, wearable sensors, autonomous systems). Others are not mature yet, but are in an advanced stage of testing (e.g. armed robots, exoskeletons, and wireless power transmission for aircraft).

These technologies might appear marginal, as they constitute a small number of the total number of weapons deployed, but they are capable of revolutionizing the ‘force balance’ on a battlefield. They allow (and will allow future) armies to communicate and act speedily. Highly technology-supported and rapidly moving troops have enormous advantages on battlefields, as demonstrated in the Iraq wars. Even if some of the emerging technologies are not immediately ready for use (such as humanoid robots with advanced weapons), the relevant decisions about investments and critical capabilities need to be made today. 
 

This Trend is part of the Megatrend Changing security paradigm

Manifestations

Developments happening in certain groups in society that indicate examples of change related to the trend.

Robotisation of War

Technologies such as AI, autonomous weapons systems, big data, biotechnologies, hypersonic glide vehicle and quantum technologies are changing the world, and the way developed countries conduct wars. These and other emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT) present both risks and opportunities for NATO and Allies. That’s why the Alliance is working with public and private sector partners, academia and civil society to develop and adopt new technologies, strengthen the Allied industrial base and maintain NATO’s technological edge.

In recent years, the use of drones and other unmanned robots in warfare and other situations of violence has increased exponentially, and States continue to invest significantly into increasing the operational autonomy of such systems.

This represents an area of potential research and development and innovation investment to foster European autonomy within the defence industries. If the EU lags behind on this field, it could end up significantly dependent on North-American technology.

Signals of change: NATO, US Congressional Research Service, Tand Defence innovation changing paradigm, UK Ministry of Defence, Springer

Digitalization of war - better Hybrid Warfare

The supply chain is a consistent attack vector for threat actors today. By compromising a centralized service, platform, or software, attackers can then conduct widespread infiltration of the customers and clients of the original - singular - victim, or can choose to cherry-pick from the most valuable potential targets. This can save cybercriminals time and money, as one successful attack can open the door to potentially thousands of victims at once. In a world of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, old security models, working from home stipulations, hybrid cloud/on-premises setups, and complicated digital supply chains are no longer suitable.

Managing and creating grey conflict (i.e. pursuing political objectives through operations that fall between peaceful and war tactics) have been an important part of Russia and China’s activities in the international arena. Grey conflict is used to avoid triggering a military response, or to compensate for an asymmetry of power. 

Signals of change: ZDnet, JSTOR, Journal of Strategic Studies, Reuters, CyberPeace Institute

Unconventional weapon production and use

Havana syndrome has been in the news since 2016, i.e. the mysterious illness suffered primarily by US embassy personnel. The cause is still not fully clear, but now attributed most likely to directed microwaves, or possibly ultrasound. The circumstances point to deliberate attacks on individuals, but it has not been possible to attribute them to any actor. Another 'unconventional' item that occurred recently was the killing of an Iranian nuclear scientist inside Iran, reportedly by an AI-controlled gun. What these attacks have in common is that they target individuals, civilians, outside any war zone, and are unclaimed and unattributed. The new Turkish-made Kargu-2 quadcopter drone can allegedly autonomously track and kill human targets on the basis of facial recognition and AI.

The use of advanced technology, autonomous systems, cyber tools and AI will create more opportunities to target individuals far away from battle zones. This may be seen as a form of hybrid warfare, creating an insecurity similar to terrorism, but with precision-strike capability.

Signals of change: National Academies, BBC

Shaping public perception (propaganda and fake news)

Direct distribution on social media of pictures and videos by people at the forefront of conflict come frequently without any editorial filter and can be more disturbing to viewers than traditional news coverage. This can be a more stressful experience for citizens. It could eventually lead to bigger emotional support for military actions and economic sanctions, but, on the other hand, also to news avoidance. In particular, the quantity and the emotional charge of the testimonies directly from the battlefield could trigger a more wide condemnation of the conflict by citizens, businesses and in the end governments, or could reinforce social cohesion in the face of big challenges.

In countries that were part of the Eastern Block, media outlets linked to, or supported by the Russian government and home-grown media and pro-Putin social media accounts, aim to sow confusion, fear, and to erode trust in Western and democratic institutions and the EU through disinformation.

Even though we already knew that: 1) propaganda, disinformation and wide control of a conflict’s narrative play a significant part in the conflict itself; and 2) Social Media has played a decisive role in recent political processes such as the USA Elections and Brexit, this could represent a slightly innovative and distributed approach to virtual warfare. Influencers, that range from normal citizens, fighters and leaders, could help to control the narrative, boosting morale internally, and gaining support externally.

Signals of change: OECD, Rand, DW, France24

Conditions for the development of large-scale future battlefields

The conditions for the large-scale development of these trends include:

- to have the human potential necessary for the development of robotics and the digitalisation of wars;

- designing a legal and regulatory framework for these technologies and their use;

- to limit strategic dependence on the raw materials, components and energy sources needed for these technologies;

- have sufficient economic capacity to ensure large-scale financial investment;

- the maintenance of geopolitical competition justifying high-level military expenditure;

- Increase dual use of military and civilian technologies and create stronger synergies across the European military industry.

Signals of change: NOW, NCBI, Medium, Defence innovation changing paradigm

Interesting questions

What might this trend imply, what should we be aware of, what could we study in more depth? Some ideas:

• What if ...nuclear weapons are used?
• What if are we are not ready to undo 'gene drive'?
• What if "gene sensitive" bio weapons are developed, making it possible to target ethnicities?
• What if a no-flight zone would have been declared?
• What if what if all genome databases were corrupted/tampered?
• What if genomic/bio databases are tampered with potentially dangerous sequences (toxins, mutated genes), ...?
• What if gene drive is used to transmit a disease (for animals or humans) are we ready to undo the editing?
• The first bacteria resistant to all viruses has been developed. What if this ability is transferred to some humans?
• What if mercenaries develop the war-as-a-service business model further?
• What if Putin is physically eliminated?
• What if in addition to COVID-19, the climate crises, and the Russian invasion in Ukraine, we see another "unexpected” major crisis? How much can society take before internal conflicts become dominant?
• What if after the Ukrainian conflict, more countries decide to develop nuclear weapons - Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees?
• What if there is eventually more dissent in Russia?
• What if nanobots were to be deployed to attack EU capitals with biochemical weapons?
• What if tech experts refuse to collaborate in weapon development?