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Knowledge4Policy
Knowledge for policy
Competence Centre on Foresight

We foster a strategic, future-oriented and anticipatory culture in the EU policymaking process.

  • Page | 11 Jul 2023
Battlefields (version 2021)

Trend: Future battlefields (former trends)

A trend indicates a direction of change in values and needs which is driven by forces and manifests itself already in various ways within certain groups in society.

There is increasing attention on emerging technologies for military use, such as drones, armed robots and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in weapons. Some of the technologies are already mature (e.g. drones, hypersonic weapons, wearable sensors, autonomous systems). Others are not mature yet, but are in an advanced stage of testing (e.g. armed robots, exoskeletons, and wireless power transmission for aircraft).

These technologies might appear marginal, as they constitute a small number of the total number of weapons deployed, but they are capable of revolutionizing the ‘force balance’ on a battlefield. They allow (and will allow future) armies to communicate and act speedily. Highly technology-supported and rapidly moving troops have enormous advantages on battlefields, as demonstrated in the Iraq wars. Even if some of the emerging technologies are not immediately ready for use (such as humanoid robots with advanced weapons), the relevant decisions about investments and critical capabilities need to be made today. 
 

This Trend is part of the Megatrend Changing security paradigm

 


 

Manifestations

Developments happening in certain groups in society that indicate examples of change related to the trend.

 

Human capital

Advanced technologies require specific knowledge and expertise at all phases of development, from conception to final application. Researchers and engineers in each technology field develop and test concepts that are later applied and managed on the battlefield by military engineers. Soldiers are specifically trained to use them. The largest constraint against adopting these technologies at a relevant scale is the need for knowledgeable and qualified personnel. Even if there was a physical abundance of the devices, their use is limited by the low availability of human capital. 

Signals of change: NSCAI, NATO, RAND

 

Live and let die

Values, ethics and legal frameworks drive the absorption of technology in society, as well as its assimilation in the military domain. They are of particular importance for fully autonomous systems and human enhancement technologies and for the use of such devices in the military domain. Legal frameworks and regulations are often lagging behind new technological advancements and can be a constraint in the timely development of military capabilities. Without global regulations, new civil and defence technologies will inevitably be used in conflict. Considering the particular sensitivity and ethical aspects involved, the EU should act as a leader, pushing for initiatives that support global legislation, or even pushing for a ban on some of these devices to level the playing field, and protect against large risks. 

Signals of change: COMECE, MERICS, TNSR, Medium

Openness, dependencies and strategic autonomy

Access to advanced technologies brings dependencies related to availability. For example the commercial availability of devices manufactured by other countries, the availability of components and sub-systems produced abroad that are necessary to assembly devices in the EU. The EU is dependent on others for critical raw materials, such as rare earth elements, that are required to manufacture products (e.g. lithium for batteries). Most of the necessary raw materials are not available in Europe and are extracted from a limited set of world regions. Several of them are in conflict and others (such as China), can exploit their dominant positions not only economically, but also from a geo-economic perspective.

The current ongoing discussions about ‘strategic autonomy ’in the EU are fundamental, and need to be extended beyond technical components (such as microchips), to the cyber dimension (e.g. software). This is particularly relevant for cybersecurity because vulnerabilities introduced by components shortages could compromise entire military systems (and hospitals and many other systems). 

Signals of change: BDI, EC, ECFR

Economic development

The economy is a main driver for consistent military capabilities. This is evident if one compares the total military expenditures of various rich countries. In contrast to civil industry, the defence industry develops products only if there is a customer. Specifications are provided by military services and nations provide the (public) money. Without public spending there would be no military capabilities. Therefore it is not possible for a country with a low GDP to have a high performance in defence Research & Development (R&D), or industrial military production. The availability of budgets and financing of R&D is fundamental to become a leading geopolitical actor. The cost inflation for military expenditure should also be considered, because over time it reduces the availability of defence equipment. 

Signals of change: NATO, EC, Our World in Data, Lockheed Martin Corporation

Geopolitical competition

Geopolitical competition is the main engine that drives military expenditure and pushes for more research on military technologies. Being a developed country is not enough to justify high military expenditure. Geopolitical competition drives training in needed skill areas for certain technical jobs. This happened between the US and USSR in the 70s-80s and is occurring between the US and China now. The EU should act to avoid being the weakest player in the geopolitical competition.

The former President of the Commission José Manuel Barroso said that “Sometimes a crisis is necessary to inspire an EU debate”. The present geopolitical trends have raised awareness at the political level of the EU about the need for a common defence policy. However, the power to make effective decisions is in the hands of EU Member States. In this case the driver of the driver seems to be the willingness to act at a European level, to have a proper, joined up ‘EU mind-set’.

Signals of change: NCBI, US 16th AF, Clingendael

 

Dual-use military and civilian technologies

Advanced technologies are emerging in the military sector, including exoskeletons, AI and machine learning, drones and robots, though most of them were developed by the civil sector for civil applications. The technology transfer (from civil to military) that has made these quickly-evolving technologies successful in the military sector as well, relies heavily on civil Research and Development and on civil industries. A strong civil industrial base interconnected with the military defence industry is a winning model, particularly in the EU.

The opposite technology transfer model (i.e. military-to-civil) is particularly effective in countries such as the US. There, the government robustly funds research on military technologies from its very early stage of development. This public funding for research on advanced military technologies acts as technology development multiplier for the civil sector too, (for e.g. the internet was a DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency) project. The opportunities offered by this second model for civil industry and for the economy in the EU are substantial. The obstacles or limitations of it however are the fragmentation of research programs and industry capabilities. In the EU the defence industry follows innovation coming out of civil industry. This reality makes the dual-use concept more important to consider in the EU than in the US. 

Signals of change: Northrop Grumman, PEI-connects, EC

 


 

Interesting questions

What might this trend imply, what should we be aware of, what could we study in more depth? Some ideas:

  • Will the Member States’ policy makers and industrial stakeholders be able to quickly embed an EU mind-set in their policy and investment decisions? What could the EU institutions do to support a rise of this EU awareness? (High level EU policy makers are aware that in order to mobilise resources, more awareness about the strengths deriving from the European project is necessary).

  • Which degree of ‘autonomy’ could the EU reach with its industrial allies (e.g. the US) and commercial partners (e.g. China, etc)? Which set of actions supporting strategic autonomy should the union move towards (e.g. raw materials and/or products within the supply chain for technologies and software)?