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  • Story | 10 Mar 2025
Fertility and migration, and population decline – The EU at a demographic crossroads

A recent report by the JRC examines how the components of fertility and migration will shape the EU's demographic future, revealing a nuanced picture where Western and Eastern Member States face starkly different challenges.

EU's population at a demographic turning point ​

The European Union stands at a demographic turning point. After decades of growth, its population is poised to peak at 453 million around 2026 before beginning a gradual decline. Behind this shift lies an interplay of low birth rates, migration patterns, and an aging population structure that varies across the continent.​

This demographic transition represents one of the defining challenges for the EU's future economic competitiveness, regional cohesion, and social systems—requiring policy responses that both address root causes and adapt to new demographic realities.​

A report by the JRC, The role of migration and fertility for the future size of the EU’s population,  examines how the components of fertility and migration will shape the EU's demographic future, revealing a nuanced picture where Western and Eastern Member States face starkly different challenges. The analysis shows that while migration can temporarily offset population decline in some countries, it cannot fully compensate for persistently low fertility rates across the board.

The negative population momentum​

The EU's demographic decline stems primarily from two factors: fertility rates that have remained below the natural replacement level of 2.1 births per woman since the 1970s, and an aging population structure that creates negative ‘population momentum’. ​

​This means that the population begins to decline, even if fertility rates are at or above replacement level. This happens when a country or region has a large proportion of elderly people, and the number of deaths exceeds the number of births. Consequently, the population may continue to shrink for a period before stabilising, as the smaller number of younger people entering the reproductive age group cannot fully replace the ageing population. The opposite effect of ‘positive momentum’ occurs in youthful populations, where a large proportion of young people can sustain population growth even if fertility falls below replacement level.​

In the EU, these factors combined (declining fertility rates and ageing populations) could drive a 14% population decline by 2050 if left unchecked. Migration from outside the EU provides some counterbalance, as does increasing life expectancy. However, these positive contributions only partially offset the projected losses, resulting in an expected 5% overall population decline by mid-century.​

Not all EU Member States are expected to experience population decline. Countries like Luxembourg, Ireland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France are projected to continue growing. However, many Eastern Member States are already shrinking dramatically. Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Latvia have lost over 20% of their peak populations since the 1990s, with further declines expected.​

The zero-sum game of mobility

The policy brief highlights a striking East-West divide in migration patterns. Western European countries generally benefit from positive net-migration both from outside the EU and from other Member States. Meanwhile, Eastern European countries experience significant emigration to Western Europe, creating a 'zero-sum game' of EU mobility, where movement within the union is not mitigating the demographic decline, only shifting it from one region to another. It is important to consider this migration imbalance when assessing the fertility rates that are needed to maintain stable populations.​​

Migration adjusted fertility rates

The migration-adjusted replacement fertility rate (MAFR) takes into account the impact of migration on population growth. Positive net migration lowers the level of fertility needed to maintain a stable population in the future but only very few Member States do currently record fertility levels above this adjusted fertility threshold. ​

In countries with high immigration, like Sweden, a fertility rate as low as 1.23 births per woman would theoretically maintain population levels long-term – far below the traditional replacement threshold of 2.1. Conversely, countries experiencing net emigration, such as Lithuania, would need fertility rates as high as 2.6 births per woman to maintain stable populations – a level virtually impossible to achieve in modern developed economies.​​

A tale of three regions

The EU's demographic landscape can be broadly divided into three regional patterns:​

Western and Northern Europe benefit from both types of migration—from outside the EU and from other Member States. Countries like Sweden, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands have such high immigration levels that they could theoretically maintain population levels with their current low fertility rates if migration patterns persist.​

Southern Europe (Italy, Spain) attracts non-EU migrants but experiences slight emigration to other EU countries. Despite some immigration benefits, their extremely low fertility rates (around 1.3 births per woman) remain the strongest driver of future population decline.​

​Eastern Europe faces a demographic triple threat: low fertility, negative population momentum from an aged population structure, and significant emigration to Western Europe. While these countries gain some population from non-EU migration, these gains are insufficient to offset their losses from intra-EU migration.​

Looking forward ​

The EU's demographic challenges require nuanced approaches tailored to each Member State's specific situation. For the EU as a whole, the analysis suggests that even with optimistic migration scenarios, most Member States will continue to experience population decline and aging. ​

Migration and fertility operate on distinct timeframes and through different mechanisms. Fertility rates change slowly over time and, even if significantly increased, would take decades to address challenges such as a shrinking working-age population. Migration, on the other hand, can provide an immediate inflow of workers, particularly in sectors experiencing labour shortages. ​

Developing comprehensive policy solutions that consider both support measures for families and efficient migration policies is essential to help address the multifaceted demographic challenges facing the EU and its Member States.​