



European
Commission

The European Commission's Knowledge Centre for Global Food and Nutrition Security



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The impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on global food security – February 2023.

This sixth knowledge review of [Knowledge Centre for Global Food and Nutrition Security](#) (KC-FNS) analyses, organises and synthesises the information from 57 papers published between 1st December and 31st January 2023. The previous reviews and additional information can be consulted in the [KC-FNS page](#) dedicated to the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on global food security.

This knowledge review does not reflect an official position of the JRC or any other services of the European Commission.

KEY KNOWLEDGE

- Ukraine's grain production and exports are down approximately by 40% and 30% respectively in 2022 compared to 2021.
- Compared to 2022, Ukraine's grain production and exports are expected to decrease by 20% and 15% respectively.
- The Black Sea Grain initiative and EU solidarity lanes have allowed to export of 42 MT of agricultural products but both are confronted with difficulties.
- Overall, 2022 over 2021 world cereals production is projected to have decreased by 2%.
- 1% drop in global harvests raises food commodity prices by 8.5%.
- Fertiliser prices have eased but are double compared to pre-pandemic level. The market remains affected by supply-side issues.
- Reduction in fertiliser use could reduce yields, push up food prices and lead to agricultural land expansion.
- 1% increase in fertiliser prices boosts food commodity prices by 0.45%.
- Efficiency in fertiliser use remains a key issue: only 40% of the applied nitrogen fertilisers are taken up by crops, provoking environmental pollution.
- The FAO Food Price Index dipped for the ninth consecutive month and is 1% below its value a year earlier.
- Year-on-year, maize and rice prices are 10% and 16% higher respectively, and wheat prices are 3% lower.
- Cereal prices could drop between 5% and 8% but will remain elevated and volatile in 2023.

- Food price inflation remains high in almost all low- and middle-income countries.
- In low-income developing countries, inflation is projected to moderate from 14.2% in 2022 to 8.6% in 2024.
- High energy prices affect the poorest the most.
- Growth is projected at 5.1% in 2023 for low-income countries (LICs), insufficient for poverty alleviation.
- 15% of low-income countries are in debt distress, and an additional 45% at high risk of debt distress. One in five developing countries is locked of global debt markets.
- High shares of private creditors and China in the poorest countries debt stocks make debt restructuring harder.
- In 2023, a record 339 million people – twice as much as in 2019 - will need humanitarian assistance.
- Food affordability remains a challenge at both the macroeconomic level and at the household level.
- Food insecurity will reach a new peak in 2023.
- 5% increase in the real price of food raises the risk of wasting in children by 9% and severe wasting by 14%.
- UN and partner organizations aim to assist 230 million people most in need in 2023 across 68 countries, which will require \$51.5 billion.
- Among the main recent policy recommendations: speed-up debt restructuring, invest in efficient fertiliser use, provide incentives for the production of nutritious food, and develop nutrition-sensitive social safety net systems.

Impact on global agricultural production and exports

Impact on Ukrainian production and exports

The Ukrainian government said that about 51 million tonnes (MT) of grain could be harvested in 2022, down from a record 86 MT in 2021 (40% less) [Reuters]. Compared to 2021, the drop in wheat, maize, and sunflower harvests comes roughly to 40-50%, 25%, and 35% respectively [Agence Europe; Reuters]. 22% of the wheat harvested in 2022 - 26.6 MT - is located in the occupied territories and out of the control of Ukraine [Les Echos].

Based on a nation-wide survey targeting 5,230 rural households across the country, 25% of the rural population has stopped or reduced agricultural production due to war, and this percentage reaches 38% in areas along the front-line. Market participants are experiencing difficulties in accessing

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
Advancing knowledge towards zero hunger and sustainable food systems

agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, etc.), finance, and lack of fuel and electricity to power equipment. Increase in agricultural production costs was widely felt across the country [FAO]. Transport costs to ports have more than doubled and alternative route — by truck to Romania — costs almost 4 times more [New York Times]. Combined with a low sales price, incomes of rural households were negatively affected with more than one third of the interviewed reporting a significant decrease [FAO].

This could negatively affect 2023 crop potential with a grain harvest forecasted at 35 to 40 MT, including 12-15 MT of wheat and 15-17 MT of maize. Winter wheat sowing was 17% reduced compared to 2022's harvested area, and the projected maize area is down by 30% to 35% [Reuters].

Looking at cereals exports, Ukraine would have exported 18.1 MT in the 2022-2023 marketing year, a drop of nearly 30% compared to the 25.8 MT exported at the same stage of the previous season [FAO; Les Echos]. Grain exports could further decrease to 15 MT in the 2023/2024 season [Reuters] (compared to 54.9 MT in 2019-2020 and 44.9 MT in 2020-21).

Ukraine Corn Output & Exports (million tonnes)




Data source: U.S. Department of Agriculture

@kannbwx


Under the Black Sea Grain Initiative, approximately 19 MT Ukrainian agricultural products have been exported since August 1st. Low and lower-middle income countries have received 44% of the wheat exported under the deal [Joint Coordination Centre]. However, Russia is being accused of deliberately slowing down the compulsory inspections (from 10 per day in Sep./Oct. to 5 in Jan.) and more than a hundred cargo ships with grain are stuck in the Bosphorus, increasing the clearing time up to 21 days and adding to shipping costs (+20%) [Hellenic Shipping News].

Share of grain export by country wealth



Source: Black Sea Grain Initiative Joint Steering Committee - Get the data

Through the EU Solidarity Lanes, 23 MT of grain, oilseeds and related products have been exported since May 2022. They have enabled the export of 60% of Ukraine's grain since the start of the war [EU]. Six member states have complained that this influx of agricultural goods – free of tariffs and quotas – disturbs local markets and put EU farmers at a disadvantage [Euractive].



Source: EU

Impact on production and exports from other countries

Wheat production in 2022 should reach a record level, up to 0.4% year-on-year. For maize and rice, forecasts are 4% and 2.4% below 2021 output respectively [AMIS]. Overall, 2022 over 2021 world cereals production is projected to have decreased by 2%. The global cereal stock-to-use ratio would drop from 30.9 percent in 2021/22 to 29.3 percent in 2022/23, marking the lowest level since 2013/14, but still representing a relatively comfortable supply situation [FAO].



Source: FAO


Without any more major disruptions, further global food shortages are not expected to emerge in 2023 [IFPRI]. Research from [IMF] shows that 1% drop in global harvests raises food commodity prices by 8.5%.

In EU, a combination of the exceptional 2022 summer drought and high fertiliser prices resulting in lower application rates of phosphorous and potassium in particular, also contributed to lower yields for the 2022/23 harvest. As a result, total EU cereal production is now forecast to be 7.8% lower year-on-year, with maize showing a staggering 23.7% reduction in production. However, thanks to higher ending stocks in 2021/22, EU cereal exports could still grow (+6.5%) [EU].

In low-income countries, conflict, possible adverse weather events, and rising production costs are anticipated to keep food supplies tight. Reduced use of fertiliser and other farming inputs whose costs have risen sharply is envisaged to result in below-average agricultural production this year [World Bank]. Lack of import capacity may affect food availability (e.g. Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa) [IFPRI].


Cereal import requirements have increased in 2022/23 in Arab countries. In North Africa¹, USDA projects a 12% higher import requirement for 2022/23 (30.2 MT) than for 2021/22 (26.85 MT). For selected Middle East countries, USDA than for 2021/22 (26.85 MT). For selected Middle East countries², USDA projects 7% higher production for wheat in 2022/23 (17.59 MT) than in 2021/22 (16.5 MT). It foresees a 2% increase in the import requirements for 2022/23 (23.32 MT) than in 2021/22 (22.9 MT). Due to their dependence on international commodities markets including the Russian Federation and Ukraine to a large extent, several countries in the region aim to increase the diversification of imports from countries such as Brazil, Argentina or India.

The share of exports affected by export restrictions has fallen by over 50% from its May peak. By mid-July, the amount of affected trade had fallen to 7.3%, and largely remained at that level over the rest of 2022 [IFPRI].



Impact on the fertiliser market and fertiliser use

Led by a drop in energy price and weak demand, fertiliser prices have eased from their early 2022 peaks but they remain at historically elevated levels [IFPRI; World Bank]. Their prices are double compared to pre-pandemic level [IMF].



Fertiliser market remains affected by supply-side issues:

- Production crunch in Europe. However, a drop in input costs has allowed some shuttered nitrogen fertiliser production facilities to resume operations [AMIS; World Bank];
- Potash exports from Belarus have fallen by more than 50% due to the EU restriction on using its territory for transit purposes [World Bank];
- Reduction in the volume of Russia fertiliser exports (10%) [Financial Times];

- Export restrictions in China; Exports of phosphate and urea fertilisers fell respectively by nearly by 50% and 60% [World Bank];
- Reduction in global ammonia trade mainly due to the closure of a pipeline through Ukraine [Financial Times].

High price will likely depress fertiliser usage, which in turn will affect yields, especially of rice, wheat, and maize [IFPRI]. This could further push up food price. [IMF] calculates that 1% increase in fertiliser prices boosts food commodity prices by 0.45%.

Furthermore, reduced land use intensification arising from higher input costs could lead to agricultural land expansion and associated carbon and biodiversity loss [Nature].

High prices put fertilisers out of reach of many small farmers in Africa. Despite the continent produces approximately 30 MT of fertiliser each year - twice as much as it consumes -, approximately 90% of the quantity consumed is imported, mostly from outside the continent. This reflects important trade inefficiencies [World Bank]. In sub-Saharan Africa, for all but four countries for which data for 2019 is available, domestic use of fertiliser was fully supplied by imports. This import dependency renders them particularly vulnerable to price increases on world markets [EU].

Many African governments have intervened to make fertilisers affordable for farmers through subsidies, taxes removals, and public purchases [Africa Fertilizer Watch].

The fertiliser crisis has put in perspective an efficiency issue. While application rates are considered much too low in Sub-Saharan Africa (22 kg per ha), reducing crop yields, they are wastefully high in other parts of the world (146 kg per ha in average) [World Bank]. It is estimated that globally, only around 40% of the nitrogen fertilisers applied to agricultural land is taken up by crops, and that about half is lost to the environment, reducing air and water quality and damaging human health [Nature]. A research published in [Nature] concludes that nitrogen losses can be cut by 30–70% while increasing crop yield by 10–30%. The global societal benefits of reducing agricultural nitrogen pollution are more than 15 times the implementation costs [Nature].


Impacts on agricultural commodity prices and food price inflation

Impact on agricultural commodity prices

The FAO Food Price Index dipped for the ninth consecutive month in December 2022, declining by 1.9% from the previous month. It averaged 132.4 points in December, 1% below its value a year earlier. However, world food prices remain at elevated levels with many staples near record highs, and with prices of rice increasing [FAO].

¹ Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia

² Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen



Year-on-year, maize and rice prices are 10% and 16% higher, respectively, and wheat prices are 3% lower. Maize and wheat prices are 31% and 12% higher, respectively, than in January 2021, and rice prices are 5% lower [World Bank]. Both solidarity lanes and the Black Sea Grain Initiative have notably contributed to lowering prices [EU].


Global food price should remain elevated in 2023 because of [IMF]:

- Impact of the exceptionally long La Niña weather conditions until early 2023;
- Uncertainty related to The Black Sea Grain Initiative. If suspended again by Russia, this would reduce global wheat and maize supplies by 1.5% and raise cereal prices by 10%;
- High energy prices raise fuel and fertiliser prices, boosting food production costs, but they also divert output from food to biofuels. Increase in fertiliser price may take up to one year to feed directly into global cereal prices.

As for downward price pressures, in addition to slowing global economic growth, which has a modest direct effect on food prices, central bank interest-rate hikes tend to discourage inventory holdings and reduce speculative activities in commodity futures markets, thus putting downward pressure on food prices [IMF].

Trading in futures markets suggests that wholesale cereal prices will only drop 8% next year from the current highs [IMF] (5% according to the [World Bank] forecast). For [IFPRI], increasing rice prices are a concern over the coming year, due to high fertiliser price, extreme weather events, and potential export restrictions.

Price volatility should remain high especially for wheat. Global stock-to-use ratios for grains remain at around or below the lows of recent years. This indicates price instability is likely to intensify with any major supply shock [IFPRI].




As for energy prices, they are projected to decline by 11% in 2023 but would still be 75% above their average over the past

five years [World Bank]. The drop in gas and oil prices will benefit the entire food supply chain [WEF]. However, increasing energy prices have been found to have a higher and longer-lasting effect on food prices than a decrease [EU].



Impact on food price inflation

Information from the latest month between September and December 2022 for which food price inflation data are available shows high inflation in almost all low- and middle-income countries; 83.3% of low-income countries, 90.5% of lower-middle-income countries, and 91% of upper-middle-income countries have seen inflation levels above 5%, with many experiencing double-digit inflation. In real terms, food price inflation exceeded overall inflation in 90% of the 162 countries for which data are available [World Bank].



Food Price Inflation: Top 10 List			
Country	Nominal food inflation (%YoY)	Country	Real Food Inflation (%YoY)
Zimbabwe	285	Zimbabwe	41
Venezuela	158	Rwanda	28
Lebanon	143	Lebanon	21
Argentina	95	Hungary	20
Türkiye	77	Uganda	19
Ghana	60	Egypt	16
Sri Lanka	59	Colombia	15
Rwanda	59	Lithuania	13
Suriname	55	Slovakia	13
Haiti	53	Montenegro	13

Source: International Monetary Fund, Haver Analytics, and Trading Economics. Note: Food inflation for each country is based on the latest month from September to December 2022 for which the food component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and overall CPI data are available. Real food inflation is defined as food inflation minus overall inflation.

Higher international food prices are estimated to have added 6 percentage points to consumer food inflation in 2022 and are forecasted to add an estimated 2 percentage points in 2023. The pass-through to higher domestic retail food prices could take 6 to 12 months [IMF] and interconnected with food import dependence and insulation policies [IFPRI].



“War and adverse weather set to keep food prices high,” by Emiko Terazono and Valentina Romei. *The Financial Times* (December 4, 2022).

About 84% of countries are expected to have lower headline (consumer price index) inflation in 2023 than in 2022. Global inflation is set to fall from 8.8% in 2022 (annual average) to 6.6% in 2023 - 5.2% for [World Bank] - and 4.3% in 2024 - 3.2% for [World Bank] - above pre-pandemic (2017–19) levels of about 3.5%. In low-income developing countries, inflation is projected to moderate from 14.2% in 2022 to 8.6% in 2024 - still high, but close to the pre-pandemic average [IMF].

In poorer countries, inflation has risen rapidly, partially caused by the greater share of food in consumer spending than in wealthier countries [World Bank]. Most developing countries are net food importers and the urban poor and a large share of rural poor people are net food buyers with a high share of food expenditure and rather inelastic food demand, making them particularly vulnerable to food price inflation and its adverse effects on access to nutritious food [EU].

The very poorest also bear large costs of high energy prices. The share of energy consumption of non-food consumption is highest for the very poorest. Individuals below the international poverty line of \$2.15 spend more than a quarter of their non-food consumption on energy, while individuals with a daily income above \$50 spend less than 10% of their non-food consumption on energy [World Bank].

In the [WEF] Global Risks Report 2023, the “Cost-of-living crisis” has been ranked as the most severe global risk over the next two years. In many import-dependent countries, this could turn into a wider humanitarian crisis.

Macroeconomic impact in developing countries

For low-income countries (LICs), growth is projected to 5.1% in 2023. Despite this forecast, high inflation, tight monetary policy, and debt distress are expected to restrain domestic consumption and investment. Soaring import bills and shortages of foreign exchange reserves could further constrain imports of staple food, fuel, and fertiliser [IFPRI]. For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is home to 60% of the world’s poor, per-capita income growth is expected to average just 1.2% over the next two years - a rate that would cause poverty rates to rise [World Bank].

About 15% of low-income countries are estimated to be in debt distress, with an additional 45% at high risk of debt distress and about 25% of emerging market economies also at high risk [IMF]. At the end of 2021, the external debt of the developing economies totalled \$9 trillion, more than double the amount a decade ago. During the same period, the total



external debt of IDA countries (e.g. the poorest countries) nearly tripled to \$1 trillion. Roughly 1 in 5 developing countries is effectively locked out of global debt markets, up from 1 in 15 in 2019 [World Bank].

Higher borrowing costs and currency depreciations have made matters worse for many developing countries whose debt is denominated in U.S. dollars [IMF; World Bank]. The poorest countries now spend over a tenth of their export revenues to service their long-term public and publicly guaranteed external debt - the highest proportion since 2000. Furthermore, the increased shares of private creditors and China in debt stocks have made debt restructuring much harder [World Bank].

Many LICs face a fiscal crisis that could push millions more into poverty and could hinder the ability of countries to increase access to electricity, clean water, and foundational learning skills and meet the demands of climate change [World Bank], and to protect consumers from food price shocks [IFPRI].

Impact on food security and nutrition

In 2023, a record 339 million people will need humanitarian assistance and protection - a significant increase from 274 million people at the beginning of 2022 [OCHA; IRC]. East and Southern Africa have the largest number of people in need (76.8 million) [OCHA].



Food insecurity is projected to reach a new peak in 2023, surpassing the food crisis experienced in 2007-2008 [World Bank]. Food affordability remains a challenge at both the macroeconomic level (capacity of countries to pay their food import bills) and at the household level (increased prices in local currency for imported food and energy, and reduced


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prospects to raise incomes given the outlook of a global economic slowdown) [IFPRI].

According to [WFP], an estimated 828 million people are already hungry, including 345 million in acute food insecurity, more than double 135 million in 2019. People in 49 countries are currently at risk of famine³.


According to [FAO], 45 countries, including 33 in Africa, nine in Asia, two in Latin America and the Caribbean, and one in Europe, are in need of external assistance for food. Conflict-related market disruptions, high food prices, and extreme weather events remain the key drivers of severe acute food insecurity across the globe, with particular concerns for countries in East and West Africa [FAO]. The third consecutive year of La Niña in 2022 will prolong severe drought conditions in the Horn of Africa, increasing food insecurity and famine in the region [EU; World Bank].



Source: FAO

New publications from [FAO]⁴ show that food insecurity has worsened 2021. In 2021, 56.5 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean were affected by hunger and the number of people experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity increased from 205.2 million in 2019 to 267.7 million in 2021. For Asia and the Pacific, 396 million people were undernourished and an estimated 1.05 billion people suffered from moderate or severe food insecurity in 2021.

To better understand the nutritional impacts of such crises, [IFPRI] carried out a new analysis, which shows on average for all children younger than five, that a 5% increase in the real price of food raises the risk of wasting by 9% and severe wasting by 14%. There are larger wasting risks for boys, rural children, and children from asset-poor and landless households.



Source: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Note: Coefficients derived from linear probability regression models that interact food inflation with gender, location, poverty status and land ownership (**in rural areas only).

The income of the poorest will not catch up with higher prices, and it will affect nutrition as people modify their diets towards less nutritious foods in favour of cheaper calories, contributing to the double burden of malnutrition [IFPRI]. For instance, 22.5% of the Latin America and the Caribbean population cannot afford a healthy diet, and in Asia and the Pacific, at the cost of \$3.98 per person per day, healthy diets are unaffordable for nearly two billion people [FAO].

International response

United Nations agencies are calling for urgent action to protect the most vulnerable children in the 15 countries⁵ hardest hit by an unprecedented food and nutrition crisis. More than 30 million children in these countries suffer from wasting – or acute malnutrition – and 8 million of these children are severely wasted, the deadliest form of undernutrition [FAO].

The UN and partner organizations aim to assist 230 million people most in need in 2023 across 68 countries, which will require \$51.5 billion. The percentage of people in need of humanitarian assistance has doubled in just four years. The gap between needs and funding received has never been wider or more concerning. Expanding global humanitarian needs, rising operational costs and commodity prices and high inflation in 2023 are contributing to a significant rise in requirements. For example, the World Food Programme’s monthly food procurement costs are now 44% higher than before the pandemic [OCHA].

The EU has adopted its initial annual humanitarian budget of €1.7 billion for 2023 [EU].



Policy Recommendations

Among the most recently discussed policy recommendations:

Macroeconomics [World Bank; IMF]

- Encourage more investment to create jobs, increase output, and boost production, allowing growth in consumption.
- Improve the business enabling environment and strengthen the rule of law.

³ According to the 2022 Mid-Year Update of the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC), 205.1 million people in 45 of the 53 countries / territories included in the GRFC 2022 are in crisis situation or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

⁴ Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition in Latin America and the Caribbean; Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition in Asia and the Pacific.

⁵ Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen.

- Increase debt transparency and strengthen debt restructuring frameworks.
- Integrate climate and development in ways that increase energy access and speed up the transition to lower-carbon energy.
- Strengthen cross-border trade.
- Better target fiscal support at those most affected by elevated food and energy prices.

Food security and nutrition [FAO; IFPRI; World Bank]

- Create incentives for the diversification of the production of nutritious foods.
- Develop nutrition-sensitive social safety net systems.
- Improve school menus.
- Improve inter-regional agri-food trade.
- Repurpose inefficiencies and distortive subsidies (\$635 billion in the agriculture sector, and \$577 billion for fossil fuel subsidies): investments in resource use efficiency, renewable energy, health, education, and targeted cash transfer programs.
- Maintain trade flows. Evidence suggests [ScienceDirect] that food export restrictions offer, in some cases, a temporary respite from price surges by boosting short-term domestic supply but have unintended negative consequences for food producers in most cases. Food export restrictions lead to high economic costs in terms of lost producer revenue, forgone agricultural investments, high enforcement costs, and high fiscal costs for procuring and maintaining larger than normal food reserves.

Fertilisers [World Bank] [WEF]

- Avoiding stockpiling.
- Increase production.
- Improve intra-African fertiliser trade.
- Reduce subsidies for consumption.
- Improve use efficiency (e.g. precision agriculture).
- Invest in green fertiliser production (e.g. use of manure and nutrients from sewage).
- Using more legume crops in rotations.
- Addressing food waste is also a way to reduce the need for fertiliser.

List of documents analyzed

[Africa Fertilizer Watch] [Tracking Fertilizer Situation Across Sub Saharan Africa](#)

[Agence Europe] [Les États membres de l'UE préoccupés par la situation des marchés agricoles](#)

[AMIS] [Market Monitor – December 2022](#)

[BNE] [What does 2023 hold for Belarusian potash exports?](#)

[Devex] ['Very, very worried': Another bleak year expected for food security](#)

[Euractive] [Commission to reconsider EU-Ukraine agri-food trade liberalisation](#)

[Euractive] [Agri crisis fund could ease blow of Ukraine grain influx, says Commissioner](#)

[EU] [Humanitarian aid: EU increases funding to €1.7 billion for 2023](#)

EU - [COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT - Drivers of food security](#)

[EU] [Infographic - Ukrainian grain exports explained](#)

[EU] [EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes Factsheet](#)

[EU] [Infographic - Ukrainian grain exports explained](#)

[EU] [ASAP Nov 2022 - Fifth consecutive season hit by drought in East Africa; Delayed rainfall onset in North Africa and Middle East](#)

[FAO] [FAO outlines three pillars of action for initiatives in Ukraine in 2023](#)

[FAO] [World food prices dip in December](#)

[FAO] [FAO Food Price Index continued to drop in December, however, it rose substantially on a yearly basis](#)

[FAO] [Ukraine: EU-FAO partnership to ensure recovery and development of agricultural value chains](#)

[FAO] [Ukraine: Impact of the war on agriculture and rural livelihoods in Ukraine](#)

[FAO] [CROP PROSPECTS and FOOD SITUATION- December 2022](#)

[FAO] [UN Report: 131 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean cannot access a healthy diet](#)

[FAO] [Key messages from the Asia and the Pacific Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 2022](#)

[FAO] [Food Policy Monitoring in the Near East and North Africa region, 4th Quarter 2022](#)

[Financial Times] [Russian fertiliser export revenue surged 70% in 2022 as prices jumped](#)

[Hellenic Shipping News] [Inspections of Ukrainian grain ships halved since October](#)

[IFPRI] [Is food price inflation really subsiding?](#)

[IFPRI] [Food export restrictions have eased as the Russia-Ukraine war continues, but concerns remain for key commodities](#)

[IFPRI] [Food inflation and child undernutrition in low and middle income countries](#)

[IFPRI] [Food price shocks and diets among poor households in Egypt](#)

[IMF] [Global Food Prices to Remain Elevated Amid War, Costly Energy, La Niña](#)

[IMF] [WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND UPDATE – Jan 2023](#)

[IRC] [Emergency Watchlist 2023: Time to build back the guardrails \[Joint Coordination Centre – Datasets\]](#)

[Les Echos] [La Russie s'approprié une partie des céréales ukrainiennes](#)

[Nature] [How to feed the world while reducing nitrogen pollution](#)

[NatureFood] [High energy and fertilizer prices are more damaging than food export curtailment from Ukraine and Russia for food prices, health and the environment](#)

[New York Times] [How Russia's War on Ukraine Is Worsening Global Starvation](#)

[OCHA] [Global Humanitarian Overview 2023](#)

[Reuters] [UPDATE 1-Ukraine grain exports down 29.6% at 18.1 mln T so far in 2022/23](#)

[Reuters] [Column: Ukraine corn crop plunge balanced by huge stocks, aiding exports for now](#)

[Reuters] [UPDATE 1-Ukraine 2023/24 grain crop likely to fall to 35-40 mln T - producer](#)

[ScienceDirect] [The effects of food export restrictions on the domestic economy of exporting countries: A review](#)

[Successful Farming] [Play it again: High and volatile commodity prices in the year ahead](#)

[UN] [Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel - Report of the Secretary-General](#)

[WEF] [How will the global economy impact food prices in 2023?](#)

[WEF] [The Global Risk Report 2023](#)

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