One podcast at a time

Mitigating Discrimination towards Migrants in Colombia using edu-taintment

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Crisis

Venezuela

A crisis

Global South in 2020

Colombia
2,200,000

Equador
514,000

Peru
1,300,000

Brazil
345,000

Chile
500,000

Argentina
500,000

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Discrimination

Venezuelan migration

Figure 7.2 Perception of discrimination

Chile: 31.9% / 68.1%
Colombia: 26.3% / 73.7%
Ecuador: 40.0% / 60.0%
Peru: 33.5% / 66.5%

■ Yes ■ No

World Bank (2024), Venezuelans in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – A Development Opportunity

Colombia

A unique case

Figure 1.1 Number of Venezuelans, 2018–22

World Bank (2024), Venezuelans in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – A Development Opportunity

Colombia

Education

Figure 5.4 Distribution of educational level of hosts and Venezuelans

World Bank (2024), Venezuelans in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – A Development Opportunity

Colombia

Job market

Figure 6.2 Employment gap between hosts and Venezuelans, by age group

Employment gap (percentage points)

Chile
- 46.3
- 19.7
- 13.4
- 16.0

Colombia
- 9.3
- -4.4
- -8.1
- -4.7

Ecuador
- 31.3
- 3.9
- 12.6
- 8.5

Legend: 18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–65

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Review

Our approach

Edu-taintment
= education + entertainment

Grady et al (WD 2021)

Edutainment interventions used to boost political participation, support for democracy, tolerance of minorities

Exposure to broadcast media can change behavior by linking desired behaviors to pre-existing goals

Scarce evidence on how media leads to adopting new goals

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**I**nstitute

Literature

La Ferrara et al (AEJ 2012)

FIGURE 4. TIMING OF FERTILITY DECLINE AROUND YEAR OF GLOBO ENTRY

The Adventures of Superman (1946)
Operation Intolerance
Armand et al (IZA 2024)

Figure 6: The effect of *Operation Intolerance* on interracial assimilation

A. Average mixed friendships, by cohort

B. Cohort study on mixed friendships

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This paper

The intervention

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Design

Timeline

February | **March** | **April** | **May** | **June**

Feb 2nd to April 10th
Recruitment
Sample=4090

April 5th to 18th
Baseline
Sample=2052
Control=872
Treated=1180

May 9th to 20th
Final
Sample=1025
Treated=521
Control=504

13 - 24 junio
Tracking
Sample=844
Treated=419
Control=425

Treated: Radio soap

April 11th — Ep 1- 5
April 19th — Ep 6- 10
April 25th — Ep 11- 15

Podcast

WhatsApp

Podcast

Episode #6: 6 minutes and 9 seconds

Students are training for a soccer tournament
Women want to play and (some) men claim that soccer is for men
Frankie (V) says that women do play soccer in Venezuela
As team captain, Pelusa is strongly against the idea of mixed teams
Erika responds that women are part of other School teams
Frankie tells Pelusa to let women play:
"If they score first, they will be part of a mixed team"
Pelusa smiles and accepts
Frankie joins the women's team and Erika scores first
The school gets a mixed team

Randomization #1

Treated versus control

	Total	Treated	Control
Baseline	2052 56.7% F	1180 56.6% F	872 57% F
		Podcast	
Final	1025 53% F	521 51.44% F	504 54.7% F
Tracking	844 52.61% F	419 48.21% F	425 57% F

Randomization #1: Balance

Endline

	Control	Treated	P-value
Age	21.24 (1.59)	21.21 (1.59)	0.7196
Education (t)	38.09 (48.61)	42.22 (49.43)	0.1810
SES	2.29 (0.866)	2.32 (0.829)	0.4661
Male	44.69 (49.76)	48.26 (50.02)	0.2580

Relative scales

Interpersonal trust

In this question we want to know your level of trust in different groups of people
We will use as a reference point your level of trust in an average *Bogotano*
Using a scale of -5 to +5, if you trust members of that group as much as you trust an average *Bogotano*, choose 0
If you trust them more, use positive values between +1 and +5, where +5 means you trust that group a lot more, +1 just a little more
If you trust them less than an *average Bogotano*, use negative values between -1 and -5, where -5 means you trust that group much less, -1 just a little less

Buchan et al (2009, 2011), Enke et al (2022), Goffin & Olson (2011), Olson et al (2007)

Randomization #2

Baseline: vignette experiment

	Sex	
	Male	Female
Colombian	T1	T3
Venezuelan	T2	T4

Nationality

Randomization #2

Baseline: vignette experiment

Imagine a young person like you who is managing a fast-food stand in a similar neighborhood

The business is doing well, so they need help. Anyone interested should leave a resume and fill out a form.

It's Thursday evening. Only one resume arrived, from **Daniel** Martínez, born in **Bogotá** on August 15, 2002, an only child living with his mother, whom he helps financially, studying at SENA, claiming to be active, resourceful and with an excellent ability to serve

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Imagine a young person like you who is managing a fast-food stand in a similar neighborhood

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Scenario #1

Job seeking scenario

Using a relative scale... how likely do you think that the manager of the business will...

...review the resume?

...call Daniel/Daniela for an interview?

...hire Daniel/Daniela?

Bicchieri and Fatas (2021), Yang et al (2017)

Randomization #2

Fast-food scenario

Someone like you (…) is managing a fast-food stand in your neighborhood
Late in the evening, when cleaning and about to close the business, **Luis**, a young man of about 21 years old arrives, talking on the phone, his accent is from **Bogota**, with a jacket full of stains and a dirty hair. **Luis** says that that he just finished working, that he is very hungry. He orders a hot dog and a soda.

Using a relative scale… how likely do you think that the manager of the business will…
…prepare the hot dogs and offer Luis to sit?
…ask Luis to show if he has enough money to pay for the hot dog?
…decline to serve **Luis** out of fear of being robbed?

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Results (I)

Diagnosis

Fifteen episodes

Listening to the podcast

	Endline	Tracking
Episodes finished (0-15)	9.344	9.838
	(6.346)	6.196
Finish block (%)	0.615	0.648
	(0.427)	(0.417)
Score (0-9)	4.547	4.859
	(3.517)	(3.491)
N	521	419

Discrimination

Job application

Discrimination

Job application

|	(1) Review	(2) Interview	(3) Hire
Men	-0.0106	-0.125	-0.166
	(0.198)	(0.189)	(0.183)
Venezuelan	-0.549***	-0.822***	-0.748***
	(0.200)	(0.185)	(0.184)
Men*Ven	0.169	0.121	0.142
	(0.286)	(0.271)	(0.263)
Constant (Woman)	7.021***	5.726***	6.636***
	(0.977)	(0.893)	(0.892)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,038	2,038	2,038

Controls: age, education, SES, sex, Petro
Robust standard errors between brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Discrimination

Job application

Heterogeneous effects

Job application

Systemic discrimination

Job application

	(1) Documents today	(2) Documents tomorrow	(3) Well treated
Men	-0.0692	-0.0392	0.0502
	(0.154)	(0.162)	(0.177)
Venezuelan	-1.032***	-1.398***	-0.413**
	(0.155)	(0.166)	(0.171)
Men*Ven	-0.211	-0.290	-0.387
	(0.224)	(0.241)	(0.253)
Constant (Woman)	7.122***	5.349***	4.412***
	(0.744)	(0.798)	(0.858)
Controls	Si	Si	Si
Observations	2,038	2,038	2,038

Controls: age, education, SES, sex, Petro
Robust standard errors between brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Results (II)

Treatment effects

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**I**nstitute

Mistrust

## Baseline versus Endline

Beliefs: Crime

**Baseline versus Endline**

Beliefs: Work ethic

Baseline versus Endline

Neighbors

Baseline versus Endline

Beliefs and attitudes

Baseline versus Endline: diff-in-diff

	(1) Mistrust	(2) Work	(3) Crime	(4) Neighbors
Treated	0.624**	0.757***	0.699**	0.464
	(0.266)	(0.238)	(0.272)	(0.308)
Constant	-5.286***	-4.837***	0.868	-2.335
	(1.831)	(1.669)	(1.809)	(2.082)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,017	1,017	1,017	1,017

Controls: age, education, SES, sex, Petro

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Heterogeneous effects

Endline

**Table 5**: Heterogeneous effects
Endline, Tobit models, DV= happy neighbors

Co-V	(1) Tertiary	(2) Hombre	(3) Petro
Treated	0.529**	0.913***	1.044***
	(0.241)	(0.254)	(0.256)
Co-V	-0.212	0.763***	0.188
	(0.281)	(0.270)	(0.270)
Treated*Co-V	0.509	-0.431	-0.632*
	(0.379)	(0.372)	(0.370)
Predicted	4.122	4.130	4.122
Observations	1,025	1,017	1,025

Robust standard errors between brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tracking survey

6

Discussion

Limits and lessons

Limitations

One podcast at a time

Sampling: pro-social participants may be more willing to participate

Dual randomization

Social desirability bias: participants may be willing to look kind

Vignette experiments and dual randomization

Non-incentivized belief elicitation: easier said than done

Beliefs' change consistent with other answers

Non-validated by admin data

No follow up after six months (back to Superman)

Conclusions

Bogotá youth DO NOT exhibit intersectional discrimination

The intervention…

…reduces mistrust in Venezuelans by 80%

…changes beliefs about migrants by 20%

…increases acceptance as neighbors by 17%

…very limited heterogeneous effects (political orientation)

Results persist a month later

Thanks!

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